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Between Two Palm Trees:  
Reading the Constitution in Paradise
Derek A. Webb
For as long as we have had a Constitution, we have been debating how to 
interpret it. With the conclusion of the Supreme Court’s recent 2013 term and 
its handful of closely divided, hotly contested cases,1 we can rest safe in the 
assumption that, despite the notable uptick in unanimous decisions issued by 
the Court,2 the figurative “end of history”3 in constitutional interpretation, in 
which the major partisans in our annual Constitutional skirmishes lay down 
their arms and settle upon one particular interpretive lens through which 
to read the Constitution, is nowhere in sight. If Alexander Hamilton and 
James Madison, two of the Constitution’s principal architects and leading 
spokesmen who co-authored The Federalist, could not later agree on the meaning 
of the words on the page to which they had signed their names, should we 
expect to do any better?
But despite their deep disagreements over how to read the Constitution, 
Americans from across the spectrum still seem to revere the old musty 
document. In an era of increasing polarization4 and growing skepticism 
1. The major constitutional law related 5-4 decisions of the Supreme Court’s October Term 
2013 (hereinafter “OT”) included McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), 
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014), Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), Hall 
v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), and Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
2. Robert Barnes, For These Supreme Court Justices, Unanimous Doesn’t Mean Unity, Wash. Post, 
July 1, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/for-these-
supreme-court-justices-unanimous-doesnt-mean-unity/2014/07/01/94003590-0132-11e4-b8ff-
89afd3fad6bd_story.html (suggesting that “stark divisions… exist on the court beneath a 
frequent veneer of 9-0 comity.”). 
3. The phrase comes from Francis Fukuyama, the end oF history and the Last man (1992).
4. Political  Polarization in the American Public, PeW research  ctr. (June 12, 2014),  http://
www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf (detailing 
various ways in which “Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines—
and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive—than at any point in the last two decades.”).
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about many things official5—Congress, the president, the Republican and 
Democratic parties, business corporations, even the Supreme Court, etc.—
the Constitution remains, as it has throughout much of American history, a 
document that continues to pull powerfully on the heartstrings of citizens.6 
Americans may hate politics, as the pundit E. J. Dionne7 has observed, and 
distrust their government, but they continue to love the governing document 
that structures our politics and organizes our government.
And yet while Americans seem to revere the Constitution, they do not 
necessarily read it that often.8 Not unlike that beautiful, color-coded collection 
of the Great Works in the Western World that sits impressively in one’s home 
library, quietly collecting dust along its immaculately gold-encrusted pages, 
the thing is practically too good to read. Surely there is something better, and 
easier, and more enjoyable available on Netflix? And who, frankly, makes a 
point of reading the Constitution anyway, except for the occasional crank or 
eccentric old senator? Why not leave that task to the professionally trained 
lawyers among us whose job it is to pay attention to these sorts of things?
But one of the more remarkable facts about legal education today—and 
indeed for some time now—is that aspiring lawyers themselves rarely get the 
chance to study the Constitution as a whole. Instead, they encounter the 
Constitution mostly sifted through the mediating prism of constitutional law, 
the doctrines and precedents of the Supreme Court in which the Justices have 
attempted to say what the Constitution, as law, is. And they usually do so in 
ways that break up the overall text into more manageable and discrete bits, 
often taken out of their original context and natural sequence. A traditional 
constitutional law course, for instance, might begin with Article III, Section 
2 (Marbury v. Madison), leap back to Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 (Commerce 
Clause), hop forward to Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 (Necessary and Proper 
Clause), jump back again to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (Spending Clause), 
zoom forward to the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, retreat into the 
President’s various sundry powers under Article II, Section 2, and then after a 
further brief spell in Article I or III, depending upon tastes, conclude with the 
privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2. The Bill of Rights 
5. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Confidence in U.S. Public Schools at New Low, GaLLuP (June 20, 2012), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/155258/Confidence-Public-Schools-New-Low.aspx; see also Millennials 
in Adulthood: Detached from Institutions, Networked with Friends, PeW research ctr. (March 7, 2014), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/03/2014-03-07_generations-report-version-for-
web.pdf.
6. The AP-National Constitution Center Poll, associated Press (August 2012), http://surveys.
ap.org/data%5CGfK%5CAP-NCC%20Poll%20August%20GfK%202012%20Topline%20
FINAL_1st%20release.pdf (reporting that 69% of Americans agree that the “The United 
States Constitution is an enduring document that remains relevant today.”).
7. See generally, e. J. dionne, Why americans hate PoLitics (1991).
8. See Zinie Chen Sampson, Most in U.S. Haven’t Read Constitution, VA-based Survey Says, 
PiLotonLine.com (Sept. 16, 2010), http://hamptonroads.com/2010/09/
most-us-havent-read-constitution-vabased-survey-says.
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tends to suffer a similar, discombobulating fate.9 The First Amendment is 
often studied on its own, with the religion clauses hermetically sealed from the 
speech, press, and assembly clauses. The Fourth and parts of the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eighth Amendments are studied in a separate class on criminal procedure. 
The Seventh is tackled in civil procedure. And Constitutional Law II takes up 
the rest, with large helpings from the First (usually just speech and religion), 
Second, Fifth (takings clause), Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In other 
words, after three years of law school, you may have read it all at some point, 
but probably not, and probably never in one sitting.
The piecemeal and often incomplete study of the Constitution in law 
school is itself a function of studying the Constitution often exclusively 
through the lens of Supreme Court decisions, which of necessity are focused 
on just those relatively few parts of the text that are particularly susceptible to 
litigation in courtrooms. Over the course of its first nine years, for example, 
more than seventy-five percent of the constitutional law-themed cases that 
came before the Roberts Court from 2005 to 2014 revolved exclusively around 
six Amendments—the First (seventeen percent), Fourth (thirteen percent), 
Fifth (eight percent), Sixth (twenty-one percent), Eighth (five percent), and 
Fourteenth (thirteen percent).10 Now these Amendments unquestionably 
represent seismic, critical, and hard-fought protections of the rights of 
individuals and groups against government. But as a matter of sheer textual 
heft, they make up less than ten percent of the entire text of the Constitution. 
The vast majority of those laboring in the vineyards of Supreme Court 
litigation and academic constitutional law, in other words, are focused on a 
precious small bit of overworked terrain, while large swaths of rich acreage go 
regularly unexplored and uncultivated.
This past academic year, I had the privilege to guide a few hardy souls 
through those other parts, in a seminar here at Stanford Law School called 
“Reading the Constitution.” Joining the ranks of other adventurous-sounding, 
gerundively titled courses, like “Wildlife Trafficking” and “Accounting for 
Lawyers,” the seminar was organized around the text of the Constitution itself, 
beginning at the beginning, with the summoning of “We the People” in the 
Preamble, and concluding with that 1990s throwback, the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, itself a throwback to an amendment that initially failed to secure 
enough votes for ratification in the 1790s. In between, we encountered the 
peaks and valleys, low-lying plains, mountainous cliffs, and seemingly hidden, 
long-since-forgotten parts of what the constitutional theorist Sanford Levinson 
has called both the “Constitution of Conversation,” that familiar ten percent 
9. For an extended analysis of the problems associated with studying the Bill of Rights in 
disaggregated bits and pieces, see Burt Neuborne, “The House was Quiet and the World was 
Calm the Reader Became the Book”—Reading the Bill of Rights as a Poem: An Essay in Honor of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, 57 Vand. L. reV. 2007 (2004).
10. These numbers are based upon a review of the approximately 275 constitutional law-related 
cases decided by the Supreme Court from 2005 through to the conclusion of its OT 2013 in 
June 2014.
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of the text whose meaning remains largely contestable and which has thus 
become a regular feature of Supreme Court litigation and public debate, and 
the “Constitution of Settlement,” the rest of the document whose meaning 
is mostly settled and uncontroversial, but which significantly and almost 
subterraneously structures and defines much of our public life today.11
Reading all the Constitution in this way, and not just the juicy parts, seems 
to make some space for thinking about the Constitution in ways that are 
genuinely independent of politics and policy preferences. When one focuses 
exclusively on the “Constitution of Conversation,” it is not uncommon for the 
predictable polarities and pathologies of our broader political conversation 
to replicate themselves in constitutional debates. This, in turn, tends to lead 
sophisticated observers of these conversations to conclude, not without 
some reason, that constitutional law, contra Justice Kagan,12 is really politics 
all the way down, an infinitely malleable, thin veneer for policy preferences.13 
Tell me what a person’s policy views are on abortion, prayer in school, gun 
control, and affirmative action, the argument goes, and one can predict with 
near certainty what his views will invariably be on seemingly technical legal 
doctrines like substantive due process, the endorsement test, the relationship 
between the prefatory and operative clauses of the Second Amendment, 
and the level of scrutiny appropriate for racial classifications. Reading and 
reasoning through the entire Constitution, by contrast, tends to disarm those 
armies that otherwise clash by night over constitutional meaning, and opens 
up a little room for listening to and learning from the text itself on its own 
terms, and in its entirety.
Reading the entire text itself, by itself, on its own terms, however, does 
not always answer all the questions one might have about constitutional 
meaning. As Madison put it in 1796, looking back on his own handiwork from 
the vantage point of nearly ten years, the text itself would have been just words 
on a page, “nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into 
it, by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state conventions. 
If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument, beyond the 
face of the instrument, we must look for it not in the general convention, 
which proposed, but in the state conventions, which accepted and ratified the 
11. See sanFord LeVinson, Framed: america’s FiFty-one constitutions and the crisis oF 
GoVernance 19 (2012).
12. During her confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Kagan, 
responding to a question about whether law can only take the judge the “first twenty-five 
miles of the marathon,” memorably said that it was actually “law all the way down.” The 
Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103 (2010).
13. Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, n.y. times (May 10, 2014) http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/05/11/upshot/the-polarized-court.html?abt=0002&abg=1 (quoting visiting 
Stanford Law professor Justin Driver’s concern that it is “becoming increasingly difficult 
to contend with a straight face that constitutional law is not simply politics by other means, 
and that justices are not merely politicians clad in fine robes.”).
703
constitution.”14 Perhaps following Madison’s lead on this, Supreme Court 
advocates today frequently craft their litigation efforts with at least one eye 
on the historical meaning of the text’s words and phrases. Since just 2000, for 
example, lawyers have submitted more briefs to the Supreme Court that have 
cited and engaged explicitly with the “original meaning” of various provisions 
of the Constitution than had been done in all of the country’s previous 
history. And last term, OT 2013, lawyers submitted briefs that engaged with 
founding-era history or the original meaning of a phrase in the Constitution 
in 23 distinct cases decided by the Court. Attentive to this fact, and lest the 
seminar wrap up after just two hours of reading the Constitution with a long 
coffee break, we also looked carefully at the text’s historical context, the often 
colorful wellsprings of life, contestation, and compromise that breathed life 
into the law.
When lawyers do history, the results are not always pretty. Just as 
constitutional litigators are often charged with bending the text of the 
Constitution to fit their preferred outcome for a particular case, lawyers’ 
legal history (as opposed to historians’ legal history15) is often suspected to 
be little more than “law office history,” the selective and opportunistic lining 
up of quotations from presumptively authoritative sources ripped from any 
meaningful context that happen to most favor one’s position. Give me fifteen 
minutes and I’ll get you the perfect quote from Thomas Jefferson to support 
that motion for/against summary judgment. Additionally, when lawyers do 
use founding-era history in particular, there is a suspicion that what really 
motivates this is nothing more than an unreasoning “ancestor worship”16 in 
which a presumptively monolithic set of “Founders” (with a capital F) sits 
in disdainful judgment of whatever contemporary political, legal, or cultural 
practice the speaker himself just so happens also to oppose. The Founders 
would be appalled! And there is, of course, the alternative approach, which 
returns the favor of disdain back upon the founders, judging their lot to 
be a mostly monolithic cabal of wealthy, white, male, slavocratic aristocrats 
whose achievements represent mostly obstacles to progress and the spread of 
democracy.17
No single seminar could possibly grapple adequately with all of this. But by 
spending some time with the original debates and conversations that produced 
the Constitution, on their own terms, some progress can be made. We saw that 
on at least some points of first principle and matters of specific constitutional 
meaning, a viable and meaningful consensus seemed to exist at the time of the 
14. James madison, Jay’s Treaty, in 16 the PaPers oF James madison 290, 296 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. 
eds., 1989).
15. For the distinction between “lawyers’ legal history” and “historians’ legal history,” see 
Laura kaLman, the stranGe career oF LeGaL LiberaLism 168-71 (1996) (internal citations 
omitted).
16. See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 texas L. reV. 1, 63-66 (2009).
17. For perhaps the earliest and most canonical statement of this position, see charLes beard, 
an economic interPretation oF the constitution (1913).
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text’s ratification. We also saw, however, as may be expected from a period 
of great transition and creativity like the American founding, that much was 
disputed as well, and that proponents and critics of the Constitution could be 
lined up with different understandings and different evaluations of nearly every 
little clause in it. We encountered intriguing figures from across the spectrum 
now mostly lost to history whose impression of the new constitutional system 
strikingly track many contemporary evaluations. Patrick Henry worried that 
Article V would put future constitutional amendments at the mercy of an 
astronomically small minority of opponents, making the Constitution simply 
too difficult to amend through ordinary legal channels.18 Melancton Smith, a 
moderate Anti-Federalist from New York, worried that the proposed federal 
system would tend to ably represent the interests of the extremely wealthy and 
well-placed, but remain mostly blind to those of the poor and middle classes, 
while sadly and seemingly permanently baking the protection of slavery into 
its very institutional architecture.19 And James Wilson, an influential Federalist 
from Pennsylvania, expressed profound concern that the equal representation 
of different-size states in the Senate and the Electoral College could not be 
squared with basic principles of democracy.20
And finally, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively surprising, we found 
that the study of the historical context of the text of the Constitution is not 
just a riveting 120-episode-long show of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, 
George Washington and the gang from 1787, but equally and just as important, 
the story of the life that was breathed into it during the Reconstruction Era 
after the Civil War, and the Progressive and Modern Era Amendments after 
that, which in various ways great and small, filled in, corrected, and completed 
the original Constitution.21 For all the fresh and first-rate historical research 
that has been done on the American founding over the past two generations, 
given the importance of these subsequent amendments to the overall structure 
of the Constitution, particularly via the Reconstruction Amendments, we 
stumbled through key pieces of constitutional history whose story and import 
have yet to be fully told. One small indication of this lopsided historical 
18. Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention, in the Founders’ constitution (Philip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
a5s9.html. 
19. Melancton Smith, New York Ratifying Convention, in the Founders’ constitution (Philip B. 
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available at  http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/v1ch13s37.html.
20. Records of the Federal Convention, in the Founders’ constitution (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph 
Lerner eds., 2000), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_3_1-
2s3.html.
21. For the ways in which some of the post-founding amendments to the Constitution may 
have “completed” the original, see Michael P. Zuckert, Completing the Constitution: The Thirteenth 
Amendment, 4 const. comment. 259 (1987), and Michael P. Zuckert, Completing the Constitution: 
The Fourteenth Amendment and Constitutional Rights, 22 PubLius 69 (1992). See also akhiL reed 
amar, america’s constitution: a bioGraPhy (2005), which served as a key text for the 
seminar.
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emphasis is that while there exists an impressive and easily accessible five-
volume, 3,200-page collection of primary documents keyed to everything in 
the Constitution’s text from the Preamble to the Twelfth Amendment known 
as “The Founders Constitution,”22 no comparable collection has yet to be 
produced for the Reconstruction, Progressive, or Modern-Era Amendments. 
Thus, just as constitutional law often focuses on a small percentage of the 
overall text of the Constitution, neglecting much that is fascinating and 
relevant, so too does constitutional history occasionally reflect an imbalance 
in its coverage of the unquestionably key first moment, at the expense of 
reflecting upon the significance of other moments in which life and validity 
were breathed into it over and over again.
A seminar like this is surely no substitute for more traditional constitutional 
law classes that focus primarily upon Supreme Court doctrine. It is more 
like a supplement, or perhaps in some ways a prequel, to these standard 
classes, an exploration of the vast and fascinating terrain of text and historical 
context often overlooked in doctrinal classes, but which in many ways sets 
the stage for those doctrinal developments, and may even give one a better 
perspective from which to understand and evaluate those developments. A 
few law students in every graduating class will go on to practice in the field 
of constitutional law litigation, in which the balancing formulae, three-part 
tests, and various levels of scrutiny engineered by the courts will be their daily 
tools. Far more, however, will go on to simply become citizens who follow 
the news, vote, write in to local or national newspapers, engage in, or at least 
try to gracefully endure, extended political commentary on social media, 
navigate the competing claims about the Constitution from the anchors and 
interviewees at MSNBC and Fox News, support candidates for office, and 
possibly run for elected office themselves. To take just one fairly obvious metric 
for this last point, fifty-seven percent of current U.S. senators and thirty-eight 
percent of members of the House of Representatives are themselves graduates 
of law schools.23
But in the push and pull of the political world, too, no less than in the 
venerable and orderly halls of courtrooms, the Constitution is often a 
matter of daily conversation and disputation, with conservatives and liberals, 
Republicans and Democrats, the Tea Party and the Occupy Movement, and 
the modern-day heirs of Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine laying claim to 
the Constitution and regularly putting forward their agendas as a restoration 
or fulfillment of its core meaning. Happily, however, and on its own terms, 
the Constitution is not the platform for any political party, but rather that 
singular document in our increasingly polarized political life that transcends 
these divisions and structures the terms in which those contending forces do 
daily battle. To (opportunistically) quote Thomas Jefferson (out of context), 
22. the Founders’ constitution (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/.
23. JenniFer e. manninG, conG. research serV., r42964, membershiP oF the 113th 
conGress: a ProFiLe 5 (2014).
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when it comes to the Constitution, in other words, “we are all Federalists, we 
are all Republicans.”24 Therefore, whether we are discussing the tiny portion 
of the Constitution annually litigated inside the Court, or the vast majority 
of the Constitution that structures much of our public life on a daily basis 
outside the Court, it will pay off for both categories of lawyers, from all points 
along the political spectrum, to have spent some time carefully reading the 
Constitution in its entirety. And if they can do so in paradise, so much the 
better.
24. Jefferson said “we are all republicans; we are all federalists” at his first inaugural address, 
but later newspaper commentary of the time capitalized the nouns and reversed their order. 
See First Inaugural Address, the PaPers oF thomas JeFFerson, VoL. 33: 17 February to 30 
aPriL 1801 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006), available at https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/
selected-documents/first-inaugural-address. 
